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The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) protects consumers by 
preventing anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices.1 
The FTC was created in 1914 when President Woodrow Wilson signed 
the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) into law.2 The FTC 
Act responded to the need for expanded antitrust laws and gave the 
FTC authority to regulate those laws.3 Congress vested this power in 
the FTC with the intent that the agency serve as the principal expert 
authority on anticompetitive business practices.4 The Senate 
Committee on Interstate Commerce instructed that the FTC’s staff 
would consist of experts in business, law, and economics; their unique 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Creighton University, B.A. in Psychology, minor in Business 
Administration, May 2017.  
1 About the FTC, FTC.GOV (Sept. 23, 2019, 10:25 
AM), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc.  
2 Id. (explaining that the FTC Act passed the Senate on September 8, 1914, 
passed the House on September 10, 1914, and became law on September 26, 1914). 
3 Jeffrey Liebling, Judicial Usurpation of the F.T.C.’s Authority: A Return to 
the Rule of Reason, 30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 283, 286 (1996). 
4 Id. 
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expertise would make them “more competent . . . than any court” in 
evaluating and ensuring fair business practices.5 Congress thus 
provided the FTC with broad authority6 and further anticipated that 
federal judges would defer to the FTC’s judgment on matters within 
the realm of its expertise.7 
Over a century after its inception, the FTC remains the most 
efficient regulator of commerce in the United States.8 To carry out its 
mission—to “protect consumers and promote competition”—the FTC 
leans heavily on its authority under the FTC Act.9  The FTC Act 
allows the FTC to:  
 
(a) prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; (b) seek 
monetary redress and other relief for conduct injurious to 
consumers; (c) prescribe trade regulation rules defining with 
specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and 
establishing requirements designed to prevent such acts or 
practices; (d) conduct investigations relating to the 
organization, business, practices, and management of entities 
engaged in commerce; and (e) make reports and legislative 
recommendations to Congress.10 
 
                                                 
5 51 CONG. REC. 11,083 (June 25, 1914) (remarks of Sen. Newlands). 
6 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. F.T.C., 729 F.2d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 1989). 
7 Recent Development: Federal Agency Focus: Federal Trade Commission: 
The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the Federal Trade Commission, 
49 ADMIN. L. REV. 915, 919 (1997). 
8 See 51 CONG. REC. 14,770 (1914). 
9 About the FTC, FTC.GOV (Sept. 23, 2019, 10:25 AM), 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history (the FTC further educates consumers and 
businesses regarding their rights and responsibilities as market participants, reviews 
potential mergers and challenges them when necessary, and collects complaints 
“about hundreds of issues from data security and deceptive advertising to identity 
theft and Do Not Call violations”). 
10 Enforcement, FTC.GOV (Sept. 23, 2019, 10:25 
AM), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act. 
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These powers fall into one of the FTC’s three principal areas of 
authority: investigative, enforcement, and rulemaking.11 While FTC 
activity depends equally on its investigative and rulemaking 
authorities, this comment focuses principally on its enforcement 
authority.12 The FTC relies on administrative and judicial proceedings 
to enforce federal consumer protection and antitrust laws.13 
Section 5(b) of the FTC Act introduces the FTC’s administrative 
enforcement scheme.14 This section grants the FTC authority to 
challenge “‘unfair or deceptive act[s] or practice[s],’ ‘unfair methods 
of competition,’ or violations of other laws enforced through the FTC 
Act, by instituting an administrative adjudication.”15 The FTC must 
have a “reason to believe” that a business or individual has violated a 
law before issuing a complaint to initiate a proceeding.16 After a 
complaint is filed, the respondent may decide to either settle or contest 
the charges.17 Settling the charges often results in a swift end to the 
proceedings, but challenging the charges initiates a formal proceeding 
in front of an administrative law judge.18 The administrative law judge 
renders an initial decision which can be appealed within the FTC.19 On 
appeal, the FTC reviews briefs, hears oral arguments, and issues a 
final decision that respondents may appeal to a United States Court of 
Appeals.20 If the Court of Appeals affirms the final decision then the 
court enters an order of enforcement. 21 Losing parties may seek 
review by the United States Supreme Court.22  










20 Id. (Respondents may appeal final decisions to United States courts of 
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The FTC may also pursue judicial enforcement in connection with 
a pending administrative proceeding even before determining that 
challenged activity is unlawful.23 Specifically, section 13(b) of the 
FTC Act gives the FTC the go-ahead to bring suit for injunctive relief 
to prevent the violation of “any provision of law enforced by the 
[FTC].”24 However, judicial enforcement under section 13(b) is 
limited to occasions where the FTC has “reason to believe” that a 
business or an individual “is violating, or is about to violate” any law 
regulated by the FTC, pending an administrative proceeding to 
determine that the conduct is in fact unlawful.25 The FTC most often 
acts on its ability to seek judicially enforced injunctions under section 
13(b) in cases involving consumer fraud and deception.26 The text of 
section 13(b) states:  
 
Whenever the Commission has reason to believe-- 
(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or 
is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by the 
Federal Trade Commission, and 
(2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a 
complaint by the Commission and until such complaint is 
dismissed by the Commission or set aside by the court on 
review, or until the order of the Commission made thereon 
has become final, would be in the interest of the public— 
 
the Commission . . . may bring suit in a district court of the 
United States to enjoin any such act or practice. Upon a 
proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering 
the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action 
would be in the public interest, and after notice to the 
defendant, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary 
injunction may be granted without bond: Provided, however, 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 
25 Enforcement, FTC.GOV (Sept. 23, 2019, 10:25 
AM), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act. 
26 Id.  
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That if a complaint is not filed within such period (not 
exceeding 20 days) as may be specified by the court after 
issuance of the temporary restraining order or preliminary 
injunction, the order or injunction shall be dissolved by the 
court and be of no further force and effect: Provided further, 
That in proper cases the Commission may seek, and after 
proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.27 
 
It is the FTC’s position that section 13(b) authority extends not 
only to the injunctive relief explicitly stated in the statute but also to 
the “imposition of various kinds of monetary equitable relief (i.e., 
restitution and rescission of contracts) to remedy past violations.”28 To 
be sure, restraining orders and injunctions are the sole remedies stated 
in the text of section 13(b),29 but over thirty years of case law spanning 
eight circuits supports the FTC’s interpretation. Yet the FTC’s long 
enjoyment of section 13(b)’s broad remedial scope under this line of 
precedent may have run its course—at least in the Seventh Circuit. A 
three-judge panel recently held in Federal Trade Commission v. Credit 
Bureau Center, LLC that section 13(b) does not implicitly grant the 
FTC authority to seek restitution or any remedy other than the two 
remedies explicitly stated in section 13(b): temporary restraining 
orders and permanent injunctions.30 The court reasoned that an implied 
restitution remedy does not “sit comfortably” with the plain text of 
section 13(b) and recent Supreme Court developments.31 
The Seventh Circuit’s narrow interpretation of section 13(b)’s 
remedial scope is significant because it departs not only from the 
circuit’s own long-standing precedent,32 but also splits with eight other 
circuits that continue to award restitution and other equitable remedies 
                                                 
27 FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 
28 Enforcement, FTC.GOV (Sept. 23, 2019, 10:25 
AM), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act. 
29 FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 
30 FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2019). 
31 Id. at 772. 
32 See FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989). 
5
Noonan: To 13(b) or Not to Be? How the Seventh Circuit’s Narrow Interpret
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
in addition to injunctive relief under section 13(b).33 It is noteworthy 
that while the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Credit Bureau Center 
stands alone, it emerged on the tail of the Third Circuit’s decision in 
FTC v. Shire ViroPharma. Shire ViroPharma limited the types of 
conduct for which the FTC may bring suit for in the Third Circuit 
under section 13(b).34 The FTC must now present specific facts that 
show a defendant “is violating or is about to violate” a law per the 
language of the statute; section 13(b)’s grant to bring suit does not 
extend to “a past violation and a reasonable likelihood of recurrent 
future conduct.”35 Together, Credit Bureau Center and Shire 
ViroPharma point to a concerning trend of courts curtailing the scope 
of the FTC’s judicial enforcement efforts—a trend that leaves the FTC 
particularly vulnerable.36 
                                                 
33 See FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., 815 F.3d 593, 598-99 (9th Cir. 2016); 
FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886, 890-92 (4th Cir. 2014); FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 
654 F.3d 359, 365-66 (2d Cir. 2011); FTC v. Magazine Sols., LLC, 432 F. App’x 
155, 158 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011); FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 15 (1st 
Cir. 2010); FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202 n.6 (10th Cir. 
2005); FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468-70 (11th Cir. 1996); FTC v. 
Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1991).  
34 FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 150 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding 
that section 13(b)’s grant to bring suit when an individual or business “is violating or 
is about to violate” a law enforced by the FTC does not apply to “a past violation 
and a reasonable likelihood of recurrent future conduct”). Note that the Third Circuit 
did not address the remedial scope of section 13(b) and has not had an occasion to do 
so since Shire ViroPharma. 
35 Id. The Third Circuit’s decision in Shire ViroPharma left important 
questions unanswered. The court did not address what is an acceptable time period 
following an end of unlawful conduct to bring a section 13(b) suit. For example, the 
conduct in Shire ViroPharma ceased five years prior to the lawsuit and no evidence 
indicated recurring conduct during that time period. But it remains unclear how the 
court would treat a closer call such as unlawful conduct that ended only a month 
prior to a lawsuit. See Mindy Pava & Khouryanna DiPrima, Section 13 (b)log: 
Business As Usual? FTC Practice in the Wake of Shire ViroPharma and Credit 
Bureau Center, AD LAW ACCESS (November 26, 2019, 2:50 PM), 
https://www.adlawaccess.com/2019/10/articles/section-13-blog-business-as-usual-
ftc-practice-in-the-wake-of-shire-viropharma-and-credit-bureau-center/. 
36 See Shire ViroPharma Inc., 917 F.3d at 150; Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d 
at 767; see also FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 429 (9th Cir. 
2018) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (urging the court to rehear the case en banc and 
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This Comment explores the Seventh Circuit’s limitation on FTC 
remedial authority under section 13(b) in four parts. Part one analyzes 
the history and jurisprudence of the FTC’s enforcement power. Part 
two details the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Credit Bureau Center. 
Part three presents the Seventh Circuit’s analysis and argues that the 
court erred by abruptly “[tying] the hands” of the FTC37 for two main 
reasons. First, the court misinterpreted the text of section 13(b). 
Second, the court relied heavily on a narrow, inapplicable Supreme 
Court case while ignoring a separate line of Supreme Court cases that 
are more on point.38 Part four discusses the implications of Credit 
Bureau Center: how the decision offers “brazen scammers” a grant of 
immunity39 and why FTC authority is now more vulnerable than ever. 
Part five concludes by urging the Supreme Court to grant review of 
Credit Bureau Center and restore the FTC’s enforcement authority by 
reversing the decision of the Seventh Circuit. 
 
FTC ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY: HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 
 
The Historical Path to Section 13(b)’s Current Remedial Scope 
 
Originally the FTC’s ability to prevent unfair and deceptive 
business practices was limited solely to section 5 of the FTC Act.40 
Section 5 does not permit the FTC to challenge conduct directly in 
district courts. To enforce section 5 violations the FTC depends instead 
                                                                                                                   
find that the text of section 13(b) does not support monetary relief); FTC v. 
Hornbeam Special Situations, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-3094-TCB, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 204340, at *16 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2018) (finding that a monetary award 
under section 13(b) is “not supported by the plain text of the statute, but has been 
read into it by well-meaning judicial efforts to effect the ‘purpose’ of the 
statute”). 
37 Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 786 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).   
38 See Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996). 
39 Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 797 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).   
40 David M. FitzGerald, The Genesis of Consumer Protection Remedies Under 
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on its administrative proceedings which produce cease-and-desist 
orders.41 Section 5 allows for monetary penalties, but only for 
violations of those cease-and-desist orders obtained through the 
administrative process.42 Section 5 enforcement powers, when acting 
alone, had two glaring shortcomings: section 5 did not allow the FTC 
to immediately bar deceptive practices and section 5 did not provide 




First, the proceedings leading to a final cease-and-desist order 
often take years to complete and during the process nothing prevents 
the respondent from continuing the deceptive practices and causing 
further harm to consumers.44 Congress took action to address this 
problem by enacting the Wheeler-Lea Act in 1938.45 The Wheeler-Lea 
Act added section 12 and section 13(a) to the FTC Act.46 Section 12 
grants the FTC the ability to issue administrative cease-and-desist 
orders when persons disseminate deceptive advertisements relating to 
food, drugs, devices, services, or cosmetics.47 Section 13(a) allows the 
FTC to pursue federal court action to obtain a preliminary injunction 
preventing the dissemination of challenged advertisements under 
section 12 during the FTC’s ongoing administrative proceedings.48 In 
effect, the Wheeler-Lea Act allowed the FTC, for the first time, to take 
immediate action to prohibit unfair business practices but only in cases 
involving food, drugs, devices, services, or cosmetics:49 certainly 
                                                 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id. 
44 Id. (explaining that the process for obtaining a final cease-and-desist order 
could consist of a trial before an Administrative Law Judge, FTC review of the 
Administrative Law Judge’s decision, and a court of appeals’ review of the FTC’s 
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helpful, but a partial solution at best to the FTC’s lack of authority to 
block deceptive conduct in a timely manner. Recognizing this, in 1973 
Congress added section 13(b) to the FTC Act in the Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline Act and gave the FTC authority to take swift action to obtain 
injunctions and restraining orders to end deceptive practices that 




Second, obtaining a cease-and-desist order under section 5 of the 
FTC Act protected the public from future harm but it did not remedy 
the injury to the public or deprive the violator of his ill-gotten gains.51 
The FTC attempted to address this shortcoming on its own by 
creatively applying section 5.52 The FTC held that it was a deceptive 
practice in and of itself for a respondent to retain funds gained through 
fraudulent or deceptive means and administratively ordered that 
wrongdoers return those funds to consumers.53 But courts did not let 
the FTC’s creative section 5 restitution demands stand on review, often 
finding that such a remedy is “inconsistent” with the design of the 
FTC Act.54 Congress responded in 1975 by adding section 19 to the 
FTC Act.55 Section 19 allows the FTC to “seek consumer redress in 
federal district court for either (1) violations of FTC trade regulation 
rules, or (2) acts or practices as to which the Commission had issued a 
final cease-and-desist order” so long as the FTC satisfies the court that 
a reasonable person would have known that the act or practice was 
dishonest or fraudulent.56 Section 19 expressly authorizes the FTC to 
                                                 
50 Id.; see also Robert D. Paul, The FTC's Increased Reliance on Section 13(b) 
in Court Litigation, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 141 (1988) (stating that the FTC under 13(b) 
could seek injunctions to prohibit violations not only of section 5 of the FTC Act, 
any other provision of law enforced by the FTC). 
51 FitzGerald, supra note 40. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 See id.; Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir. 1974). 
55 FitzGerald, supra note 40. 
56 Id. 
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seek relief including monetary refunds and damages in court.57 
However, the FTC can seek redress in court under section 19 only 
after a final administrative cease-and-desist order is entered.58 
Even though Congress enacted section 13(b) in 1973, two years 
prior to its enactment of section 19, the FTC did not use section 13(b) 
as a means to obtain consumer redress until the 1980’s.59 The FTC, 
using section 13(b) then began to obtain an array of remedies under 
section 13(b) such as restitution, disgorgement, asset freezes, and 
receiverships.60 Because of this development the FTC could now 
directly sue respondents in federal court and receive a judicial order 
compelling wrongdoers to return funds deceptively taken from 
consumers before making an agency determination that the conduct 
was in fact unlawful.61 This distinguishes the consumer redress aspect 
of section 13(b) from that of section 19.62  
The FTC has continued this practice since the 1980s, and until 
Credit Bureau Center courts have never interpreted section 19’s 
explicit grant to pursue consumer redress in federal court as 
foreclosing FTC authority to seek consumer redress under section 
13(b). In fact, section 19 contains a preservation of remedies 
provision, which states: “Remedies provided in [Section 19] are in 
addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 FTC Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57(b); A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade 
Commission's Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FTC.GOV 
(November 2, 2019, 11:20 AM), 
 https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority; David C. 
Vladeck, Time to Stop Digging: Failed Attacks on FTC Authority to Obtain 
Consumer Redress, 31 ANTITRUST ABA 89, 91 (2016).  
59 See Paul, supra note 50 (“In the 1970s, Section 13(b) was used by the 
Commission . . . primarily to obtain preliminary injunctions against corporate 
acquisitions.”); see also, e.g., FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431 (11th 
Cir. 1984) (granting ancillary equitable relief in addition to injunctive relief); FTC v. 
H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982) (same). 
60 See Paul, supra note 50. 
61 Id.; A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission's Investigative, Law 
Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FTC.GOV (November 2, 2019, 11:20 AM), 
 https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority.  
62 See Paul, supra note 50. 
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provided by State or Federal law. Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to affect any authority of the Commission under any other 
provision of law.”63 Courts have consistently relied on this language to 
emphatically reject the argument that section 19 forecloses remedies 




Every United States Court of Appeals, except for the Seventh 
Circuit, that has interpreted the remedial scope of section 13(b) finds 
that its text grants the FTC explicit authority to seek temporary 
restraining orders and permanent injunctions as well as implicit 
authority to seek disgorgement of unjust enrichment, restitution for 
injuries suffered by consumers, and other equitable remedies.65 To be 
clear, other equitable remedies are also included in the FTC’s own 
interpretation of section 13(b) authority. But the Seventh Circuit has 
now called this controlling interpretation of section 13(b) into 
question. In order to understand the Seventh Circuit’s Credit Bureau 
Center decision, an overview of cases relating to Courts of Appeals 
interpretations of the remedial scope of section 13(b) and the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the remedial scope of similar statutes is 
helpful. 
 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
 
While the Supreme Court has not yet directly spoken to whether 
section 13(b) authorizes restitution awards, there are nonetheless key 
Supreme Court cases interpreting other statutes that guide the 
                                                 
63 FTC Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57b (emphasis added). 
64 See, e.g., FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 367 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that “[s]ection 19 does not purport to limit Section 13(b). Quite the 
contrary, Section 19 states that ‘[n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect 
any authority of the Commission under any other provision of law.’”); FTC v. H.N. 
Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982) (same). 
65 See, e.g., FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1024-
28 (7th Cir. 1988); FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1432-35 (11th Cir. 
1984); H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d at 1110-13. 
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discussion of the FTC’s enforcement authority: Porter v. Warner 
Holding Co.,66 Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 67 and 
Meghrig v. Kfc W. 68  
In Porter, the Court analyzed whether restitution is permitted 
under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.69 That Act states that 
when the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration finds that 
a person has engaged in conduct that violates the Act, then “upon a 
showing by the Administrator that such person has engaged or is about 
to engage in any such acts or practices a permanent or temporary 
injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted” by the 
court.70 The Court noted that the language of this statute invokes the 
court’s equitable jurisdiction and that courts may go beyond the 
matters immediately underlying that equitable jurisdiction and grant 
“whatever other relief may be necessary” to ensure that equity does 
“complete rather than truncated justice.”71 Expanding on this, even 
though the Act did not explicitly authorize restitution, the Court 
nonetheless held that an order for restitution of illegal rents was an 
equitable adjunct to the explicitly authorized injunction decree.72 
“Nothing is more clearly a part of the subject matter of a suit for an 
injunction than the recovery of that which has been illegally acquired 
and which has given rise to the necessity for injunctive relief.”73 
Moreover, the Court warned that the full scope of the court’s equitable 
jurisdiction should not be denied or limited “unless a statute in so 
many words, or by necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the 
court’s jurisdiction in equity.”74  
The Supreme Court later affirmed this reasoning in Mitchell. In 
Mitchell, the Court considered if lost wages may be recovered under 
                                                 
66 Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 
67 Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1959). 
68 Meghrig v. Kfc W., 516 U.S. 479 (1996).  
69 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. § 205(a); Porter, 328 U.S. 
at 396. 
70 Porter, 328 U.S. at 397. 
71 Id. at 398. 
72 Id. at 399. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 398. 
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the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.75 That Act gives district courts 
jurisdiction to “restrain violations of [the Act].”76 The Court rejected 
the argument that jurisdiction to recover wages had to be “expressly 
conferred by an act of Congress or be necessarily implied from a 
congressional enactment” and instead found that the ability to “restrain 
violations” inherently grants district courts jurisdiction to order 
employers to reimburse wrongfully discharged or discriminated-
against employees for wages lost as a result of that discharge or 
discrimination.77 Notably, the Court in both Porter and Mitchell also 
emphasized that the Court’s equitable jurisdiction should be 
considered at its strongest since both cases implicated the public 
interest.78 Where the public interest is concerned, “equitable powers 
assume an even broader and more flexible character than when only a 
private controversy is at stake.”79 
In Meghrig, which the Seventh Circuit majority substantially 
relied on in Credit Bureau Center, the Court reviewed a restitution 
award under The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 
(“RCRA”).80 Respondent KFC operated a Kentucky Fried Chicken 
(“KFC”) restaurant in Los Angeles.81 While constructing the 
restaurant, KFC discovered that the property it built the restaurant on 
was contaminated with petroleum.82 KFC removed and disposed of 
oil-tainted soil which cost a total of $211,000.83 KFC brought suit 
under the RCRA’s citizen suit provision, section 6972, against the 
previous owners of the property seeking restitution of the clean up 
                                                 
75 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); Mitchell v. Robert 
De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 289 (1959). 
76 Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289. 
77 Id. at 289-92, 296 (stating that when Congress grants a court the power to 
issue an injunction, it “must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of 
equity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory purposes”). 
78 Id. at 291; Porter, 328 U.S. at 398. 
79 Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291. 
80 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972; 
Meghrig v. Kfc W., 516 U.S. 479, 482 (1996). 
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costs since the previous owners had contributed to the waste.84 The 
Court held that KFC’s suit against the previous owners failed based on 
two provisions of section 6972(a).85 First, section 6972(a)(1)(B) 
defines the necessary timing of an RCRA citizen suit; it permits 
private parties to bring suit against persons “who ha[ve] contributed or 
who [are] contributing to the past or present handling, storage, 
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste 
which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to 
health or the environment.”86 Second, section 6972(a) outlines the 
remedies available to a district court in a suit brought under section 
6972(a)(1)(B): district courts are permitted “to restrain any person 
who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present 
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or 
hazardous waste . . ., to order such person to take such other action as 
may be necessary, or both.”87  
The Court reasoned that the remedies described in section 6972(a) 
show that the citizen suit provision does not contemplate providing 
compensation for past clean up efforts.88 Instead, it allows for 
mandatory injunctions—ordering a responsible party to “take action” 
and clean up toxic wastes—and prohibitory injunctions—“restraining” 
a responsible party from further violating the RCRA.89 The Court 
further compared the RCRA’s language to the language of a similar 
environmental statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”).90 Based on 
the language of CERCLA, the Court reasoned that Congress could 
have explicitly provided for compensation for past clean up efforts in 
the RCRA if it intended to. CERCLA’s citizen suit provision mirrors 
                                                 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 484. 
86 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)) (emphasis in original) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
87 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
88 Id. 
89 Id.  
90 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601; id. at 483, 485. 
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section 6972(a), as it gives district courts authority “to order such 
action as may be necessary to correct the violation” under CERCLA.91 
However, CERCLA differs from section 6972(a) in that CERCLA 
expressly provides for the recovery of “all costs of removal or 
remedial action” and “necessary costs of response” and further 
provides that “any person may seek contribution from any other 
person who is liable or potentially liable.”92 The RCRA lacks any 
similar language. Based on this difference, the Court found that 
Congress “demonstrated . . . that it knew how to provide for the 
recovery of clean up costs, and that the language used to define the 
remedies under RCRA does not provide that remedy.”93  
The Court found further support in section 6972(a)(1)(B)’s 
language stating that private parties may bring suit only when the 
hazardous waste presents “an imminent and substantial endangerment 
to health or the environment.”94 Focusing on the word “imminent” the 
Court held that the RCRA is designed to remedy harms that are 
occurring now rather than compensate for costs incurred in past clean 
up efforts.95 Thus, KFC’s private citizen suit to recover the costs of 
clean up necessarily failed.96 
 
Seventh Circuit Jurisprudence Pre-Credit Bureau Center 
 
Although Supreme Court precedent does not directly speak to 
whether restitution is authorized under section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 
Seventh Circuit caselaw prior to Credit Bureau Center does, and it 
unequivocally favors a broad interpretation of the section’s remedial 
scope.97 In FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., the Seventh Circuit faced 
a materially identical challenge to the scope of section 13(b) advanced 
                                                 
91 Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 485-86.  
96 Id. at 488.  
97 See FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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in Credit Bureau Center.98 In Amy Travel, the FTC sued three 
defendant corporations and two individuals for calling customers to 
convince them to buy a vacation package and then, when the 
customers agreed to purchase a package, misusing their credit cards by 
charging them a higher price than they previously agreed to.99 This 
scam affected more than 40,000 consumers.100  
The FTC based its suit on section 13(b) of the FTC Act and tried 
the case in front of a federal magistrate judge seeking rescission of 
contracts, restitution, and injunctive relief.101 The magistrate judge 
enjoined further sales by defendants and ordered restitution.102 
Defendants appealed the magistrate judge’s finding. On appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit—in an opinion penned by Chief Judge Wood, author 
of the dissent to the denial for rehearing in Credit Bureau Center—
affirmed the magistrate judge’s holding and confirmed that section 
13(b) of the FTC Act authorizes district courts to order “necessary 
equitable relief” including restitution and rescission of contract in 
addition to a permanent injunction.103 The Seventh Circuit conducted 
an extensive analysis of equitable powers granted under section 13(b) 
of the FTC Act, and fully considered defendants’ claim that monetary 
relief is not permitted.104 The court noted that the power granted in 
section 13(b) “carries with it the power to issue whatever ancillary 
equitable relief is necessary to the effective exercise of the granted 
power” and that “restitution [is a] proper form[] of ancillary relief.”105 
The Seventh Circuit has reaffirmed this holding time and time again 
since Amy Travel.106  
                                                 
98 See id.; FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 775 (7th Cir. 
2019).  
99 Amy Travel Service, 875 F.2d at 566-70. 
100 Id. at 569. 
101 Id. at 570. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 571-72. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 571.  
106 See e.g., FTC v. Think Achievement Corp., 312 F.3d 259, 262 (7th Cir. 
2002) (stating that “[t]he court's authority [under section 13(b)] to order restitution to 
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Sister Circuit Jurisprudence 
 
The broad interpretation of the FTC’s remedial authority under 
section 13(b) finds considerable support in cases from the First,107 
Second,108 Third,109 Fourth,110 Eighth,111 Ninth,112 Tenth,113 and 
Eleventh114 Circuits. FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., a 2016 Ninth 
Circuit decision that affirmed the circuit’s prior holdings authorizing 
restitution awards under section 13(b), illustrates the reasoning 
adopted across these eight circuits.115  
In Commerce Planet, the Ninth Circuit upheld an $18.2 million 
restitution award under section 13(b).116 The defendant provided 
“online auction starter kits” to consumers for just the cost of shipping; 
however, purchasers were not aware that by ordering a starter kit they 
also agreed to purchase defendant’s monthly subscription product 
“OnlineSupplier” and only became aware of that fact upon receiving 
the first monthly charge.117 Any information alerting the consumer to 
the monthly charges was hidden in fine print.118 The FTC brought suit 
to enjoin this deceptive marketing practice and sought a restitution 
                                                                                                                   
the victims . . . is not and cannot be questioned.”); FTC v. Trudeau, 579 F.3d 754, 
771 (7th Cir. 2009); FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997). 
107 FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2010). 
108 FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 365-66 (2d Cir. 2011); FTC v 
Verity Int’l Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 66 (2d Cir. 2006). 
109 FTC v. Magazine Sols., LLC, 432 F. App’x 155, 158 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011).  
110 FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886, 890-92 (4th Cir. 2014). 
111 FTC v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (8th 
Cir. 1991). 
112 FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (2018); FTC v. Commerce 
Planet, Inc., 815 F.3d 593, 598-99 (9th Cir. 2016); FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 
1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994); FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
113 FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005). 
114 FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468-70 (11th Cir. 1996). 
115 See Commerce Planet, 815 F.3d at 593. 
116 Id. at 598. 
117 Id. at 597. 
118 Id.  
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award.119 The Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Porter120 and held that “district courts have the power to order 
payment of restitution under [section] 13(b) of the FTC Act.”121 “The 
equitable jurisdiction to enjoin future violations of [section] 5(a) 
carries with it the inherent power to deprive defendants of their unjust 
gains from past violations” through a restitution award.122 In its 
reasoning, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that section 19 
eliminates a court’s power to award restitution under 13(b).123 The 
court reasoned that section 19’s preservation of remedies provision124 
explicitly precludes that line of argument and held that section 19 
“does not eliminate the court’s inherent equitable power to order 
payment of restitution.”125  
 
FTC V. CREDIT BUREAU CENTER, LLC 
 
Background and Procedural History 
 
The Seventh Circuit decided FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC 
on August 21, 2019.126 The case followed the FTC’s investigation of 
Michael Brown, the sole owner and operator of a credit-monitoring 
service called “Credit Bureau Center.”127 Brown created multiple 
websites with similar misleading domain names to promote the service 
                                                 
119 Id. at 598. 
120 Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 
121 Commerce Planet, 815 F.3d at 599. 
122 Id.; but see FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (2018) 
(O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 
section 13(b) should change because the text of the statute “unambiguously 
foreclose[s] . . . monetary relief”). 
123 Commerce Planet, 815 F.3d at 599. 
124 FTC Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57(b) (“Remedies provided in [section 19] are in 
addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action provided 
by State or Federal law. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any 
authority of the Commission under any other provision of law.”) (emphasis added). 
125 Commerce Planet, 815 F.3d at 599. 
126 FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2019). 
127 Id. at 766 (hereinafter, Brown and Credit Bureau Center will be referred to 
as “Brown” in accordance with the Seventh Circuit majority opinion). 
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and used a “negative option feature” to lure unknowing customers to 
sign up for his service which charged a monthly subscription fee.128 
The websites advertised that potential customers could receive a “free 
credit report and score,” and focused almost exclusively on those 
offerings.129 However, the website failed to adequately alert customers 
that applying for the free credit report and score also enrolled them in 
a monthly credit monitoring service with a monthly subscription cost 
of $29.94.130 A disclaimer regarding the monthly service did appear on 
the website but in much smaller, buried text that did not provide any 
explanation as to what the “membership subscription” entailed.131 
Customers only discovered their enrollment in the service when they 
received a letter from Brown after they were automatically enrolled.132  
While Brown’s misleading websites were problematic, his 
methods for luring customers to the websites were even more so. 
Brown employed subcontractors who convinced customers to visit 
these websites by posting fake advertisements for nonexistent rental 
properties on Craigslist and instructing applicants to receive a free 
credit score from the websites in order to continue with the rental 
process.133 However, after potential “renters” received the credit score 
they never heard from the Craigslist subcontractors again.134 
Consumers were upset when they discovered their enrollment in the 
monthly credit monitoring service and complained to Brown’s 
customer service operators.135 Brown often agreed to cancel future 
charges but refused to refund any past payments.136 Brown’s scheme—
no small operation—attracted more than 2.7 million customers and 
generated over $6.8 million in total revenue.137 Credit-card companies 
                                                 
128 Id.  







135 Id. at 768. 
136 Id. (Credit-card companies canceled over 10,000 of Brown’s charges). 
137 Id. 
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that received complaints from customers cancelled over 10,000 
charges for the credit monitoring service.138 
Many of these consumers complained directly to the FTC, 
prompting an investigation into Brown’s practices, and the FTC 
formally sued Brown in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois under section 13(b) of the FTC Act in 
January 2017.139 In court, the FTC sought an injunction to prohibit 
Brown from continuing his marketing and a restitution award, alleging 
that Brown’s Craigslist advertisements and websites violated the FTC 
Act’s prohibition on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” and that the 
websites further violated the Restore Online Shopper Confidence Act 
(“ROSCA”),140 the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),141 and the 
Free Credit Reports Rule.142 The District Court issued a temporary 
injunction, froze Brown’s assets, and appointed a receiver to manage 
Brown’s company.143 Brown and the FTC then filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment, where Brown argued that section 13(b) does not 
authorize an award of restitution and, alternatively, that it solely 
authorizes equitable restitution rather than legal restitution in the form 
of penalties.144 The FTC retained its position that restitution is 
permitted under the FTC Act.145  
The district court held that Brown’s Craigslist ads and his 
websites violated the FTC Act and his websites additionally violated 
ROSCA, the FCRA, and the Free Credit Reports Rule.146 The FTC 
successfully obtained a permanent injunction against Brown, which 
severely limited his ability to continue participating in the credit-
monitoring industry, and the district court also found in favor of the 
                                                 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 15 U.S.C. §§ 8401-8405. 
141 15 U.S.C. § 1681. 
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FTC on the issue of whether restitution is permissible under 13(b).147 
The district court, relying on settled Seventh Circuit precedent,148 held 
that restitution was proper under section 13(b) and that Brown’s 
fraudulent activity warranted an award in the amount of consumer 
losses: $5,260,671.36.149  
 
Seventh Circuit Appeal 
 
On Appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Brown conceded his liability to 
the Craigslist scheme.150 But Brown attempted to contest that his 
websites violated the FTC Act or ROSCA.151 Judge Sykes, writing for 
the majority, along with Judges Brennan and Manion rejected Brown’s 
defenses and concluded that the websites clearly violated ROSCA 
because the statute required disclosure of “‘all material terms of the 
transaction’” “‘before obtaining the consumer’s billing information,’” 
and Brown’s websites undisputedly failed to disclose that the monthly 
subscription service is for a credit-monitoring service, a fact that the 
court found material.152 The court found this to be a fatal oversight of 
Brown’s liability defense.153  
Brown next challenged the district court’s grant of a permanent 
injunction.154 But, similar to his liability defenses, his argument 
against the permanent injunction deserved little more than summary 
treatment.155 He contended, under the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, that the 
                                                 
147 Id.; FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC., 325 F. Supp. 3d 852, 868 (N.D. Ill. 
2018). 
148 FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC., 325 F. Supp. 3d 852, 868 (N.D. Ill. 
2018) (citing FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571 (7th Cir. 1989); 
FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
149 Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 768. 
150 Id. at 769. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 769-70 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 8403). 
153 Id. at 770.  
154 Id. 
155 See id. at 770-71. 
21
Noonan: To 13(b) or Not to Be? How the Seventh Circuit’s Narrow Interpret
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
injunction was “unconstitutionally harsh and disproportionate.”156 This 
argument failed because the Seventh Circuit concluded that an 
injunction is not a “fine” at all under the Excessive Fines Clause.157 
Finally, Brown contested the $5,260,671.36 restitution award.158 
He contended that since the language of section 13(b) of the FTC Act 
does not explicitly grant the district court authority to award remedies 
other than temporary restraining orders and injunctions that the 
restitution award could not stand.159 In a lengthy discussion, the 
Seventh Circuit attempted to “untangle” this question of statutory 
interpretation that is “obscured by layers of caselaw.”160  
First, the Seventh Circuit looked to the FTC Act and its remedial 
structure as a whole, then narrowed in on the FTC’s enforcement 
powers under section 13(b).161 The court recognized that the FTC has 
several tools to enforce the FTC Act’s prohibition of unfair or 
deceptive business practices.162 The FTC may use its cease-and-desist 
power under section 5 and, once an order becomes final, may sue the 
respondent for legal and equitable relief in court under section 19 if it 
can prove that the respondent “would have known under the 
circumstances” that the act was fraudulent.163 The court then noted 
that section 13(b) is separate from the FTC’s cease-and-desist power 
and permits the FTC to “forego any administrative adjudication . . . 
and directly pursue a temporary restraining order and a preliminary or 
permanent injunction in federal court.”164 But this is where 
congruency between the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of section 
13(b)’s remedial scope and the FTC’s own interpretation, along with 
the interpretation of eight of its sister circuits, ends. 
                                                 
156 Id. at 770. 
157 Id. at 770-71 (noting that Brown offered “an assortment of drive-by 
arguments” to contest the permanent injunction but that each argument was “too 
underdeveloped to establish an abuse of discretion”).  
158 Id. at 771. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit first looked to the text, and began “with the 
obvious”: section 13(b) only mentions temporary restraining orders 
and injunctions, and restitution is not an injunction.165 The FTC did 
not argue otherwise; rather, the FTC argued that section 13(b)’s grant 
of restraining orders and injunctions implicitly authorizes 
restitution.166 The court disagreed, finding that “[a]n implied 
restitution remedy doesn’t sit comfortably with the text of section 
13(b).”167 The court looked at section 13(b)’s requirement that a 
respondent must be “violating” or “about to violate” a law, and found 
that this language indicates that the statute is solely forward facing 
whereas restitution is a backwards-facing remedy intended to rectify 
past violations.168 The court even postured that including restitution 
into a section 13(b) reading is “illogical” because it would mean that 
the FTC could only secure restitution for past conduct when there is 
ongoing or imminent unlawful conduct.169 The court found another 
problem with implying restitution into section 13(b). Section 13(b) 
also requires that the FTC “reasonably believe that enjoining an 
ongoing or imminent violation would be in the public interest.”170 The 
court reasoned that the public interest in stopping an ongoing harm is 
inherently separate from remedying a past injury, and including both 
in the same reading raises logical problems.171 
Next, the Seventh Circuit considered the FTC’s authority under 
section 5 and section 19 of the FTC Act and found that the language of 
those provisions specifically authorizes broad equitable relief whereas 
section 13(b)’s language conspicuously does not.172 Section 5 
authorizes district courts to “grant mandatory injunctions and such 
other and further equitable relief as they deem appropriate”173 and 
section 19 authorizes “such relief as the court finds necessary” 
                                                 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 772. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. (noting that restitution is a remedy for past actions). 
169 Id. at 772-73. 
170 Id. at 773. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(l). 
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including “the refund of money or return of property.”174 The court 
presumed that since Congress included this particular language in 
section 5 and 19 but not in section 13(b) that it did so intentionally and 
purposefully.175 Further, the court held that “if section 13(b) permitted 
restitution as a general matter, Congress would have had no reason to 
enact [section 19], which authorizes restitution under narrower 
circumstances.”176 And the court took further issue with the fact that 
section 19 provides many protections to respondents before the FTC 
can seek restitution,177 but section 13(b) does not offer any similar 
protections.178 The Seventh Circuit refused to presume that Congress 
intended to allow the FTC to circumvent qualifications by simply 
seeking restitution under section 13(b) without clear indication from 
Congress that it intended to do so.179 Moreover, the tensions amongst 
section 5 and section 19 and section 13(b) are eliminated when section 
13(b) is limited to injunctive relief that enjoins ongoing and future 
violations.180 
The Seventh Circuit held that the saving clause of section 19—
stating that the remedies in section 19 are to be in addition to other 
remedies and nothing in the section should be construed to affect the 
authority of other provisions of law—does not help the FTC’s 
argument.181 The court stated that it will not read a saving clause to 
allow section 19 to nullify itself. And regardless, even if the saving 
clause had any effect, it only effects “remedies that exist” and so it 
                                                 
174 FTC Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b). 
175 Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 773. 
176 Id. at 774. 
177 Id. (Noting that section 19 requires the FTC to give fair notice to 
defendants; the FTC can forego the notice requirement only if it obtains a final 
cease-and-desist order, brings a suit in court, and proves that the violator would 
reasonably have known that their actions were dishonest or fraudulent. Additionally, 
section 19 contains a three-year statute of limitations on bringing actions against 




181 Id. at 775. 
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“does not inform the question whether section 13(b) contains an 
implied power to award restitution.”182 
The court considered the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Porter and 
Mitchell but criticized them as being “typical of their era: The Court 
would resolve ambiguities by identifying a statute’s purpose and 
‘deducing the result most consonant with that purpose.’”183 Thus, 
courts under the guidance of Porter and Mitchell freely crafted 
remedies to enforce rights recognized by Congress.184 And caselaw 
that authorizes restitution awards under section 13(b), including Amy 
Travel, built off of this premise of Porter and Mitchell.185 The court, 
relying on Meghrig, held that modern implied-remedies jurisprudence 
no longer permits this line of reasoning.186 “Rather than presuming 
that Congress authorizes the judiciary to supplement express statutory 
remedies, the Court now recognizes that ‘the express provision of one 
method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress 
intended to preclude others.’”187 The Seventh Circuit thus overturned 
Amy Travel, holding that Porter and Mitchell cannot be applied as they 
were in Amy Travel because “it’s inescapable that Meghrig not only 
displaced Amy Travel’s categorical approach to judicially implied 





                                                 
182 Id. 
183 Id. (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics without Romance: 
Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 
275, 282 (1988)). 
184 Id .at 777.  
185 Id. at 777-78 (tracing section 13(b) interpretations based on Porter and 
Mitchell beginning with the Second Circuit in H.N. Singer in 1982 and on to the 
Seventh Circuit in Amy Travel in 1989, which formed the main basis for other 
circuits concluding that section 13(b) authorizes restitution until the present day).  
186 Id. at 780. 
187 Id. at 782 (quoting Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
1378, 1385 (2015)). 
188 Id. at 783. 
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Dissent to Petition for Rehearing En Banc  
 
Under Seventh Circuit Court Rule 40(e), when an opinion 
overrules circuit precedent and creates a circuit split the opinion is 
circulated to all judges in active service to vote on whether it should 
be reheard.189 In a Rule 40(e) vote on Credit Bureau Center, a majority 
of active service judges voted against a rehearing en banc and Chief 
Judge Wood crafted a dissent to that refusal for rehearing; she was 
joined by Judge Rovner and Judge Hamilton.190 The dissent, like the 
majority, found that the text of section 13(b) answers the question at 
hand, but came to the opposite conclusion as the majority as to what 
that answer is.191 In the dissent’s view, the text “overwhelmingly . . . 
support[s] the power of the FTC to use any of the tools that Congress 
gave it, including the one it used here, which entitles it to seek 
injunctive relief from a court.”192 While restitution is not an 
“injunction” itself, the dissent reasoned that the injunction is the 
“order from the court to do something or refrain from doing 
something,” and a mandatory injunction “orders an affirmative act or 
mandates a specified course of conduct.”193 Nothing in the text of 
section 13(b) “deletes from the list of possible affirmative acts that an 
injunction may include an order requiring the enjoined party to return 
ill-gotten gains.”194 The dissent urged that such reasoning “should be 
enough itself to show the error in the path the majority has taken.”195 
The dissent cited California v. American Stores Co. to support its 
textual argument. The Supreme Court in American Stores Co. 
examined whether divestiture qualified as a form of injunctive relief 
under section 16 of the Clayton Act.196 There, the Court answered in 
the affirmative and held that “the statutory language indicates 
                                                 
189 Id. at 767 n. 1.  
190 Id. at 786. 





196 Id. at 787-88; California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990); 
Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C § 26. 
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Congress’ intention that traditional principles of equity govern the 
grant of injunctive relief.”197 The dissent in Credit Bureau Center 
compared the divestiture at issue there to the equitable restitution at 
issue here, and concluded that the two are “almost identical” since 
both require the turnover of wrongfully obtained property.198 
Moreover, the text of section 16 of the Clayton Act “is not materially 
different from the language of section 13(b) of the FTC Act” and so 
“the majority’s approach conflicts with the most closely applicable 
Supreme Court decision.”199 And the majority did not point to any 
Supreme Court case ruling that a federal agency must forego one type 
of remedy that it holds to instead use another “as the majority has done 
here.”200 To the contrary, the Supreme Court recognizes that agencies 
have broad discretion to choose what tools it will use to accomplish its 
mission.201  
The dissent further disagreed with the majority’s interpretation 
that Congress would not write a statute that provides for restitution as 
a part of a section 13(b) injunction or restraining order because it 
would be “wholly irrational” given the “less-streamlined options” 
provided elsewhere in the FTC Act.202 The dissent reasoned that such a 
conclusion ignores the differences among the FTC’s options. 
Restitution under section 13(b) is the only available option if the FTC 
wants restitution to “begin right away while the case is pending,” and 
to choose that available option is a choice that agencies are usually 
allowed to make.203 The dissent also criticized the majority’s use of a 
line of cases involving implied private rights of action.204 These cases 
are inapposite. The issue at hand involves a government agency rather 
than a private party and the FTC operated under an express statutory 
                                                 
197 Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 788 (Wood, C.J., dissenting); American 
Stores Co., 495 U.S. at 281. 
198 Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 788 (Wood, C.J., dissenting). 
199 Id. 
200 Id.  
201 Id.  
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provision allowing the agency to seek injunctive relief instead of a 
private right of action.205 
Next, the dissent strongly contested the majority’s reliance on 
Meghrig. In Meghrig, the Court based its analysis on a temporal line 
drawn in the statute, that it applied only to “imminent” endangerment, 
to hold that the statute did not allow for a repayment of past 
expenditures; the Court in no way categorically excluded from 
injunctive relief an order to make payments.206 Meghrig is further 
inapposite since it concerned private plaintiffs rather than a 
government plaintiff like the FTC. The dissent concluded that the 
Government’s presence as a party points to the involvement of the 
public interest, and where “the public interest is involved in a 
proceeding, a court’s equitable powers assume an even broader and 
more flexible character than when only a private controversy is at 
stake.”207 The FTC, here, sought to “vindicate the public interest 
through a public-facing remedy aimed at an ongoing harm” whereas 
the private plaintiff in Meghrig sought a “backward-looking remedy 
that in economic substance sought damages.”208 Thus Meghrig, and 
cases following Meghrig, “do not come close to holding that a 
government agency acting pursuant to express authority to seek 
injunctive relief cannot ask for a mandatory injunction requiring 
turnover of money” and should not control.209  
The dissent then criticized the majority’s accusation that the eight 
sister circuits adopting Amy Travel’s holding did so without much 
thought. To the contrary, the dissent defended the Second Circuit’s 
opinion in FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLP, emphasizing that the court 
agreed with the decision in Amy Travel only after a “thorough and 
thoughtful consideration” of the arguments.210  
 
 
                                                 
205 Id.  
206 Id. at 793. 
207 Id.  
208 Id.  
209 Id. at 794. 
210 Id.  
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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN ITS DECISION 
 
The Court Erred in its Textual Interpretation  
 
The text of section 13(b) in no way precludes the authority of 
courts to invoke their broad range of equitable powers. And finding 
that section 13(b) authorizes restitution awards certainly is not a 
“starkly atextual interpretation.”211 To be sure, the text only speaks of 
restraining orders and injunctions. But, as Chief Judge Wood stated, 
“[n]othing whatever in section 13(b) deletes from the list of possible 
affirmative acts that an injunction may include an order requiring the 
enjoined party to return ill-gotten gains, or to pay money to a court 
escrow account, or otherwise to turn over property.”212 While the 
majority found that finding authority to order restitution improperly 
reads a remedy into section 13(b) that is not there, the same can be 
said of the majority’s finding that section 13(b) does not permit 
restitution. The court improperly reads a remedy out of section 13(b) 
when there is no clear indication in the statute to support such a 
reading. The majority instead should have looked to the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of section 16 of the Clayton Act in American 
Stores, where the Court held that Congress intended to include 
traditional principles of equity in its grant of injunctive relief in 
section 16.213 Since the language of section 13(b) of the FTC Act is 
“not materially different” from the language of section 16 of the 
Clayton Act, American Stores properly guides the textual 
interpretation of section 13(b).214 
 
The Court Relied on Inapplicable Caselaw 
 
The Seventh Circuit inappropriately grounded its reasoning in 
Credit Bureau Center on the Supreme Court’s holding in Meghrig. 
Meghrig is distinguishable since it applied to a private plaintiff 
                                                 
211 Id. at 767. 
212 Id. at 789. 
213 Id. at 788. 
214 Id. 
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seeking redress in a private cause of action rather than a Government 
plaintiff bringing suit on behalf of the public interest.215 For this 
reason, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mitchell and Porter should 
be controlling rather than its reasoning in Meghrig since Mitchell and 
Porter involved Government plaintiffs vindicating the public interest, 
like Credit Bureau Center, while Meghrig involved a mere private 
dispute.216 The Court in Mitchell and Porter instructed that where 
public interests are concerned, the court’s equitable powers should be 
construed to be the most broad and flexible.217 The Seventh Circuit’s 
decision here contradicted that guidance. Brown’s scheme directly 
implicated the public interest and defrauded thousands of consumers, 
but rather than expand the court’s inherent equitable powers in a case 
so intimately connected with the public interest the Seventh Circuit 
restricted the court’s equitable powers in a way that has never been 
done before.218 The Seventh Circuit’s finding that implied remedies 
jurisprudence has outgrown Porter and Mitchell is simply 
unfounded.219 The Supreme Court cited Porter as recently as 2016 for 
the above stated principle: “[w]hen federal law is at issue and ‘the 
public interest is involved,’ a federal court's ‘equitable powers assume 
an even broader and more flexible character than when only a private 
controversy is at stake.’”220  
                                                 
215 Id. at 792-93.  
216 See id. (government plaintiff vindicating the public interest); Mitchell v. 
Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960); (same); Porter v. Warner 
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (same); but see Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 
(1996) (private plaintiffs bringing a citizen suit). 
217 Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291.  
218 See Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 786 (Wood, C.J., dissenting). 
219
 The Third Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have both recognized that Meghrig 
did not overturn Porter and Mitchell and the cases remain controlling. See United 
States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d 1052, 1057 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Meghrig did not 
overrule or limit Porter and Mitchell”); United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 
F.3d 219, 232 (3d Cir. 2005) (there is no indication, “either in Meghrig or since, that 
the Court has abandoned the holdings of Porter and Mitchell”). 
220 Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 456 (2015) (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 
398). 
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The majority further ignored Porter and Mitchell’s instruction that 
equitable jurisdiction should not be denied or limited “in the absence 
of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many 
words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the 
court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be 
recognized and applied.”221 No legislative command supports gutting 
the equitable jurisdiction traditionally granted to courts under section 
13(b). 
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit should have looked to past 
decisions involving regulatory enactments enforced by other federal 
agencies which similarly suggest that where Congress grants authority 
to an agency to use the equitable authority of the court then “Congress 
should be held to have intended to invoke the full range of the court’s 
equitable authority unless the statute provides otherwise.”222 Notably, 
courts have upheld grants of monetary equitable relief under statutes 
allowing district courts only to issue injunctions or orders of 
enforcement in cases involving the Securities Exchange Commission, 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the Interstate 
Commerce Commission.223  
 
CREDIT BUREAU CENTER’S IMPLICATIONS CALL FOR SUPREME COURT 
REVIEW 
 
As Chief Judge Wood aptly stated, the majority’s interpretation 
“upends what the [FTC] and Congress have understood to be the status 
quo for thirty years, and . . . grants a needless measure of impunity to 
brazen scammers” engaged in deceptive business practices.224 That 
result is reflected in the outcome of Credit Bureau Center alone. 
                                                 
221 Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291.  
222 Paul, supra note 50 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; 
Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291. 
223 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971); 
CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1979); ICC v. B&T Transp. Co., 613 
F.2d 1182, 1186 (lst Cir. 1980).  
224 FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 797 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(Wood, C.J., dissenting). 
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Brown, after unlawfully pocketing millions of dollars through his 
fraudulent scheme, will pay zero dollars to consumers in restitution. 
Defendants like Brown will likely choose to litigate their claims rather 
than agree to settlements with the FTC based on the possibility that, 
like Brown, they will be able to avoid paying millions of dollars or any 
amount at all.225 To be sure, defendants in every section 13(b) case 
following Credit Bureau Center will raise the issue of whether the 
FTC may pursue restitution awards and other equitable remedies under 
section 13(b).226  
 Yet in the immediate wake of Credit Bureau Center, the FTC will 
likely continue its present enforcement approach under section 13(b) 
in every circuit except the Seventh Circuit. And the FTC will avoid 
bringing section 13(b) cases in the Seventh Circuit altogether—a feat 
that is entirely possible under section 13(b)’s favorable venue 
provisions.227 Section 13(b)’s broad venue provisions allow the FTC to 
bring suit in any district where a respondent “resides or transacts 
business,” opening a wide range of possible venues in nearly every 
section 13(b) case.228  
But even so, Credit Bureau Center threatens to have a harmful 
effect outside of just the Seventh Circuit. If Credit Bureau Center’s 
holding is adopted in other circuits, or if the Supreme Court holds that 
section 13(b) does not authorize courts to order restitution awards, 
then the FTC would likely be left to its own administrative processes 
to effectuate consumer redress.229 This would be detrimental since the 
                                                 
225 See Pava & DiPrima, supra note 35. 
226 See id.; see also Federal Trade Commission v. Match Group, Inc., No. 3:19-
cv-02281, (N.D. Tex.) (defendants arguing in a motion to dismiss that restitution and 
other forms of monetary relief are not available to the FTC under section 13(b)) (the 




227 FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)(2).  
228 Id. (the venue provision, in relevant part, states: “Any suit may be brought 
where such person, partnership, or corporation resides or transacts business, or 
wherever venue is proper under section 1391 of title 28.”). 
229 See Pava & DiPrima, supra note 35. 
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FTC’s internal processes are slow moving, and without the FTC’s 
ability to have courts freeze assets under section 13(b), an equitable 
remedy often implied through section 13(b)’s grant of injunctive 
authority, respondents may be able to dissipate unlawfully obtained 
funds before restitution is possible through the administrative process. 
The gravity of that effect on the FTC’s enforcement power, and its 
overall agency power, cannot be overstated. To illustrate, between July 
1, 2017 and June 30, 2018, the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection 
obtained 114 court orders totaling $563 million and administered 
refund programs to deliver more than $2.3 billion in refunds to 
consumers.230 These numbers drastically decrease when the FTC’s 
ability to obtain restitution under section 13(b) is removed, since filing 
a direct suit for equitable relief is the most effective way that the FTC 
obtains relief for unfair and deceptive business practices.231  
 In light of these concerns, the Supreme Court should grant the 
FTC’s recently filed petition for certiorari in this case and reverse the 
decision of the Seventh Circuit on review.232 Clarity from the Supreme 
Court will resolve the circuit split created in Credit Bureau Center and 
end ongoing confusion surrounding section 13(b). Until the Supreme 
Court takes action to restore the full breadth of the FTC’s enforcement 
                                                 
230 See John E. Villafranco & Mindy Pava, “Untangling the Knot” or “A Grant 
of Immunity to Brazen Scammers”? The 7th Circuit Rejects Restitution as a Remedy 




231 See Paul, supra note 50. 
232 The FTC filed a petition for certiorari on December 19, 2019. See Credit 
Bureau Center LLC, FTC.GOV (Dec. 19, 
2019), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/162-3120/credit-bureau-
center-llc-formerly-known-myscore-llc. Notably, petitions for certiorari have also 
been filed in FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2018) and 
FTC v. Publishers Business Services, No. 17-15600 (9th Cir. 2018); two cases from 
the Ninth Circuit upholding the FTC’s ability to obtain monetary relief under section 
13(b). Both petitions for certiorari in AMG and Publishers Business Services were 
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power under section 13(b), the FTC is powerless to effectuate timely 
consumer redress in the Seventh Circuit and is more vulnerable than 
ever in not just the Seventh Circuit, but in every jurisdiction.   
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